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Abstract  
In 2013 the UK Government announced that seven of the nation’s largest banks had agreed to 
publish their lending data at the local level across Great Britain. The release of such area 
based lending data has been welcomed by advocacy groups and policy makers keen to better 
understand and remedy geographies of financial exclusion. This paper makes three 
contributions to debates about financial exclusion. First, it provides the first exploratory 
spatial analysis of the personal lending data made available; it scrutinises the parameters and 
robustness of the dataset and evaluates the extent to which the data increases transparency in 
UK personal lending markets. Second, it uses the data to provide a geographical overview of 
patterns of personal lending across Great Britain. Third, it uses this analysis to revisit the 
analytical and political limitations of ‘open data’ in addressing the relationship between 
access to finance and economic marginalisation. Although a binary policy imaginary of 
‘inclusion-exclusion’ has historically driven advocacy for data disclosure, recent literatures on 
financial exclusion generate the need for more complex and variegated understandings of 
economic marginalisation. The paper questions the relationship between transparency and 
data disclosure, the policy push for financial inclusion, and patterns of indebtedness and 
economic marginalisation in a world where ‘fringe finance’ has become mainstream. Drawing 
on these literatures, this analysis suggests that data disclosure, and the transparency it affords, 
is a necessary but not sufficient tool in understanding the distributional implications of 
variegated access to credit.  
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Introduction  
 
In July 2013 the UK Government announced that seven of the nation’s largest banks had 
agreed to publish their lending data at the local level across Great Britain. The release of such 
area based lending data has been welcomed by advocacy groups and policy makers keen to 
better understand and remedy geographies of financial exclusion. This paper makes three 
contributions to debates about financial exclusion. First, it provides the first exploratory 
analysis of the personal lending data made available; it scrutinises the parameters and 
robustness of the dataset and evaluates the extent to which the new data increases 
transparency in UK personal lending markets. Second, it uses the data to provide a 
geographical overview of patterns of personal lending across Great Britaini. Third, it uses this 
analysis to revisit the analytical and political limitations of ‘open data’ in addressing the 
relationship between access to finance and economic marginalisation. Although a binary 
policy imaginary of ‘inclusion-exclusion’ has historically driven advocacy for data disclosure, 
recent literatures on financial exclusion generate the need for more complex and variegated 
understandings of economic marginalisation. The paper draws on recent literatures to question 
the relationship between transparency and data disclosure, the policy push for financial 
inclusion, and patterns of indebtedness and economic marginalisation in a world where ‘fringe 
finance’ has become mainstream (Aitken, 2015). Drawing on these literatures, this analysis 
suggests that data disclosure, and the transparency it affords, is a necessary but not sufficient 
tool in understanding the distributional implications of variegated access to credit.  
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the genealogy of the recent 
data release and section 3 then describes the methodology and the data, and some of its 
limitations. In section 4 we generate the geography of personal lending in Great Britain. 
Section 5 uses the results to revisit debates about financial inclusion, the move to more 
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complex and variegated understandings of lending patterns, indebtedness and economic 
marginalisation, and the role of lending data disclosure in supporting transparency. 
  
‘Disclosing’ geographies of financial exclusion 
As geographies of finance began to make headway in the literatures of economic geography 
and urban and regional studies in the mid-1990s, a number of key texts outlined the uneven 
geographies of access to financial products and services (Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Jones and 
Maclennan, 1987; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995; Marshall and Wood, 
1995; Pollard 1996). More recently, the continued ramifications of the global financial crisis 
have further demonstrated the geographically uneven and sometimes devastating 
consequences of the relationship between access to finance and economic marginalisation for 
individuals, households and enterprises (Aalbers, 2009; Hutton and Lee, 2012; Lee et al. 
2009; Pollard, 2013; Degryse et al., 2015). In the UK, there are major concerns about the 
economic and social repercussions for those seeking, but unable to find, affordable credit 
(Centre for Social Justice, 2014; Financial Inclusion Committee, 2015). Small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), for example, championed as ideological and political symbols of 
neoliberalism (Dannreuther and Perren, 2013) and employing 15.7 million people (FSB, 
2016) face longstanding problems accessing finance (Bolton Committee, 1971; Bank of 
England, 2002; Cowling et al. 2012; Lee et al., 2015; van der Schans, 2015). In the housing 
market, tightened lending criteria and a disjuncture between wage and house price inflation 
are ‘pricing out’ a generation of would-be buyers (Osborne, 2015), reducing owner 
occupation levels (DCLG, 2016) and marking ‘the death of a dream’ (HOA, 2015) for some 
constituencies. Although the subprime crisis and the austerity and technology-fuelled growth 
of ‘fringe finance’ (Aitken 2015, Brown, 2015; CMA, 2015) reveal an exploitative underbelly 
of ‘financial inclusion’, there are other developments in financial provision - credit unions, 
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community development finance institutions, Islamic banks and crowdfunding platforms 
(Appleyard, 2011; Henry and Craig, 2013; NESTA, 2014; Pollard and Samers, 2007; Sinclair, 
2014, Gray and Zhang, 2017) – that have more progressive potential. 
Given such patterns of provision and their potential consequences for citizens, 
communities and the economy, there are those who advocate the benefits of greater 
transparency in understanding the service and lending activities of financial institutions. As 
NEF/Woodstock (2006) set out, as a process of transparency, data disclosure supports the 
ability to target financial exclusion by providing the area-based lending data and information 
necessary to identify local lending markets and finance providers and, crucially, to identify 
market gaps. A key international benchmark here is the USA, where the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA 1975) - introduced amidst concerns about uneven credit provision – 
mandates most lenders to provide annual data with detail of home mortgage applications (see 
CFPB, 2016). The HMDA data has been widely used to identify and respond to exclusion: 
through the actions of banks themselves; through new competition and financial partnerships 
with alternative and community-based providers; by the activism of empowered communities; 
and through more effective policy interventions (National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition, 2013, 2015; Sakaue and Stansbury, 2015). 
In the UK, Kempson and Whyley (1999) and the Policy Action Team reports, which 
formed the basis of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (HM Treasury, 2001), 
reflected some of the early work on financial exclusion. Evidence of low lending levels in low 
income and disadvantaged communities remains since the financial crisis as banks have 
accelerated their retreat from the high street closing over 500 bank branches in 2015 (Cadman 
and Dunkley, 2015). Recent years have seen substantial policy interventions also to overcome 
the ‘patchiness’ of credit union (DWP, 2011) and community development finance provision 
in the UK (BIS/CO/GHK, 2010) and, most recently, to create the British Business Bank to 
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increase the supply and diversity of finance to SMEs, including on a regional basis (van der 
Schans, 2015). 
Yet, despite such examples, the reality of most mainstream financial markets - 
especially in the UK where just four institutions supply over 75 per cent of personal current 
accounts and over 80 percent of loans to SMEs (CMA, 2014) - is that achieving data 
disclosure and transparency, even whilst generally accepting existing market and institutional 
structures, is an ongoing battle for those organisations, groups and communities seeking to 
overcome financial exclusionii. In 2000, the UK Social Investment Task Force (SITF), as one 
of five Recommendations, argued for the voluntary disclosure by individual banks of lending 
in underinvested communities; if this was not to be achieved quickly, they advocated the need 
for legislation equivalent to the USA’s Community Reinvestment Act (SITF, 2000). By 2003, 
SITF noted some progress with one or two banks on individual level data disclosure, whilst 
the British Bankers Association had co-ordinated an industry-level aggregated data response 
on financial inclusion (SITF, 2003). By 2005, a ‘dire need’ for banks to engage in disclosure 
was noted even as it was suggested that the disclosure debate should be extended to cover a 
broader range of financial services (SITF, 2005). By 2010 the SITF called once again for a 
UK version of the Community Reinvestment Act noting that: ‘Since the call by the Task 
Force for voluntary disclosure of lending, some banks have improved their transparency, but 
the sector as a whole still does not systematically disclose lending. It is thus impossible to 
undertake meaningful analysis and comparison.’ (Social Investment Task Force, 2010, p12) 
Moreover, this renewed call for legislation, to introduce a UK equivalent of an act 
which uses transparency to require banks and financial institutions to help meet the credit 
needs of the communities in which they operate, came in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis. In the UK, this aftermath followed a taxpayer funded bail out of the UK banking 
system and growing questioning of the nature, efficacy and purpose of the UK banking sector, 
including a number of more radical calls for stakeholder and community banks (NEF, 2012; 
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Clarke, 2012; CCBS, 2015). Whilst the banking industry moved to put in place the Business 
Finance Taskforce, amongst other initiatives, in recognition of ‘the special responsibilities we 
carry…in the wake of the economic crisis’ (BFT, 2010, p.2), parliamentary pressure for more 
transparency remained, fuelled by pressure groups, a policy environment led by an 
interventionist business Minister, and Government-launched ‘industry working groups’ and 
‘learning seminars’ on the US experience of the Community Reinvestment Act. 
Within this context, a warm welcome was given when, in July 2013, the UK 
Government announced that seven of the nation’s biggest lenders had agreed to publish how 
much they lend at the local level across Great Britainiii in the markets of unsecured personal 
loans (excluding credit cards), loans and overdrafts to small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and mortgages. On announcement of this ‘lending by postcode’ data release the 
British Bankers Association (BBA) Chief Executive Anthony Browne noted: 
‘The banking industry is committed to transparency and is actively supporting the 
government, business and community groups in understanding the borrowing 
landscape for individuals and SMEs across the UK. This landmark voluntary 
agreement between the industry and government makes the UK industry one of the 
most transparent in the world and builds on our earlier commitments. The publication 
of thousands of post codes level figures will help promote greater competition 
between finance providers and lead to better evidence-based policy making’ (HM 
Treasury, 2013). 
In a slightly different vein the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ report 
‘Changing Banking for Good’ noted: 
‘Increased disclosure of lending decisions by the banks is crucial to enable policy- 
makers more accurately to identify markets and geographical areas poorly served by 
the mainstream banking sector. The industry is currently working towards the 
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provision of such information. We welcome this. It will be important to ensure that 
the level of disclosure is meaningful and provides policy-makers with the 
information necessary accurately to identify communities and geographical areas 
poorly served by the mainstream banking sector. The devil will be in the detail of the 
disclosure regime that is put in place…The Commission therefore supports the 
Government’s proposal to legislate if a satisfactory regime is not put in place by 
voluntary means’ (See House of Commons, 2013, p 201). 
 
Study methodology and the BBA data 
In December 2013, the BBA published net total lending data by postcode sector for Great 
Britain drawn from participating lenders for unsecured personal loans (excluding credit cards) 
(BBA, 2013). The participating lenders were Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group, HSBC, RBS 
Group, Santander UK, Clydesdale and Yorkshire Banks and Nationwide Building Society. 
Detailing close on £30bn of lending per quarter, the market coverage of participating lenders 
for the unsecured personal loans (excluding credit cards) data released represented an 
estimated 60 per cent of all personal loans, but only 30 per cent of the total national unsecured 
credit market, in Great Britain. 
At the time of this analysis, the BBA had released three sets of quarterly postcode 
sector lending data for Great Britain – on 17 December 2013, 8 April 2014 and 11 July 2014. 
The data covered Quarters 2, 3 and 4 of 2013 and, in principle, the almost 11,000 postcode 
sectors available in the UK. The analysis that follows used the data released for Quarter 4 
2013 and was downloaded on 15th July 2014. The datasets were accompanied by a brief 
commentary and accompanying notes describing their coverage and content (BBA, 2014). 
This data release also included columns providing data for Quarters 2 and 3 2013 which we 
used to calculate change over time and averages. 
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Data quality and robustness 
As this was the first public release of personal lending data, a number of initial assessments of 
the overall data quality were undertaken prior to analysis; these focused on data redaction, 
data consistency across quarters and missing data. The personal lending data were released as 
a single variable of total lending amounts at the postcode sector level for a particular quarter. 
The totals are a sum of lending figures for each postcode sector for each of the participating 
lenders (who also publish their individual data). The definition of the total lending variable is: 
‘drawn-down amounts from agreed borrowing facilities. They will comprise 
borrowing agreements made in the past, new borrowing agreements, repayments and 
borrowing written off.’ (BBA, 2014).  
The process of redaction 
Given the use of postcode sectors and the need to ensure customer confidentiality, filters were 
applied to the personal lending dataset by the BBA and individual lenders prior to release. 
These filters mean that: 
‘Borrowing stocks in a sector postcode is not disclosed where customer 
confidentially would be compromised (i.e. where fewer than 10 borrowers exist in 
the sector or where borrowing is highly concentrated in a small number of the largest 
borrowers in the sector)’; and, 
 ‘Individual lenders are not obliged to publish borrowing at sector level if they hold 
less than 3 per cent of personal loans in a sector.’  
The wording of these filters is ambiguous. For example, the definition of ‘highly 
concentrated’ that is applied is not clear. There is also no system of markers within the dataset 
to show which postcodes have been subject to redaction.  Overall, however, the BBA reported 
that the impact of filters on the personal lending data release was small, with redactions 
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estimated at around 1 per cent of the total value of personal loans (of participating 
institutions). Thus, the BBA reported that for Quarter 4, 366 postcode sectors were affected 
by redactions, equating to £0.4bn of lending. This is around 4 per cent of postcode sectors 
covered by the data. 
Data consistency across quarters 
Data quality across quarters was  checked by looking at the correlation between data values of 
a postcode sector from one quarter to the next: what was the level of value fluctuation?  Of 
course, we are unable to judge fully what fluctuation might be expected between quarters and 
what could be due to market forces (for example, customers moving to providers not covered 
by data disclosure). Alternatively, the filtering process might account for some levels of 
fluctuation, as might any error in the dataset. 
The data release provided headline figures showing that total personal loan lending 
values decreased by around £310 million between Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2013; this equates 
to roughly 1 per cent of total lending. A similar pattern was apparent at the postcode sector 
level, with a mean percentage change of -0.79. Change at the 10th percentile of postcode 
sector was -10.3, while at the 90th percentile it was +7.1. For some of the outlying 
observations, however, the change was very large. Growth in excess of 100 per cent was 
observed in a small number of postcode sectors; at the other end of the scale declines of 50 
per cent or more were observed. In some of the high change sectors the absolute values of 
change were relatively small; however, in others, the values ran into millions meaning the 
changes cannot be the result of changes to a small number of loans. It is unclear whether these 
very large changes reflect change in lending patterns or if a small number of postcode sectors 
were affected by filtering processes and/or suffer from errors in the dataset. 
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Missing postcode sector data 
The full BBA dataset included a significant proportion of postcode sectors for which there 
was no data recorded. Looking across the three sets of data released, around 1,900 of the 
10,839 postcode sectors (17.5 per cent) had no lending values attached in any one set of data. 
The vast majority of missing postcode sectors were the same for each quarter of data (i.e. they 
tended to be missing consistently across the three quarters of data). A number of reasons for 
this missing data can be surmised, although only blank cells are released. First, some postcode 
sectors may no longer be in use. Second, some postcode sectors may have been filtered for 
confidentiality issues leading to blank returns (in Q4 2013 release the number was 366).  
Third, some of the remaining postcode sectors had no lending during that quarter and were a 
zero rather than a blank cell return.  
An analysis of postcode sectors with missing returns was run against Census data 
(for population) structured by postcode sector to determine if there were any unexpected or 
systematic levels of missing data across postcode sector. Generally, data was jointly missing 
from the lending data and Census data, and in only just over 1 per cent of postcode sectors 
were data available from one data source but not the other. In those instances where postcode 
sectors had Census data but not lending data, these tended to have small populations. Overall, 
then, the issue of missing postcode sectors appears to relate mainly to postcodes no longer in 
use and to areas of zero or very low population. 
Redacted postcode sector data reported at higher geographical level  
Some of the data that were redacted were released in the form of an aggregate of postcode 
sectors, which is referenced to the larger postcode area in which the postcode sector falls. This 
allows total lending levels to be reported at that wider geographical scale. In the large 
majority of postcode areas this amount is less than 2 per cent of total lendingii. There are, 
however, some postcode areas where this proportion can be as much as 10 per cent or even 
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over 40 per cent in the case of East Central London – limiting the value of the data for 
detailed geographical analysis. 
Spatial variations in personal lending in Great Britain 
Notwithstanding these data limitations, an analysis of the geography of personal lending 
patterns by postcode sector for Great Britain can be undertaken. 
Aggregate personal lending per postcode sector 
Total lending figures varied greatly across postcode sectors. Using the Quarter 4 (2013) data, 
at the extremes lending ranges from almost thirteen million pounds in postcode sectors in 
South East London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Reading to less than fifty thousand pounds (for 
those postcode sectors with non-zero values), also in Glasgow and Edinburgh as well as 
places like Liverpool. 
Of course, as Rae (2015) notes, what this data provides is only a supply-side 
perspective for a geographical area (postcode sector); there is no data provided to suggest 
demand – or variations in demand – within any postcode sector. Moreover, postcode sectors 
are of very different population sizes (with the adult population ranging from fewer than 500 
people to in excess of 10,000 across sectors) – and, clearly, population size is reflected in 
(demand for) total lendingiii. The level of personal lending per capita (the level of lending 
adjusted for postcode sector population size) allows for more meaningful comparison.  Table 
1 uses a measure of the total adult population of each postcode sectoriv which is derived from 
matching the bank lending data (using the average of the three quarters of data released) 
against the 2011 Census (see also BBA, 2013)v. 
Table 1 Percentile distribution of lending per adult* 
Postcode Sector Percentile 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 
£ per adult lent 346 416 510 602 691 774 836 
*Lending per adult, average of three Quarters of data (Q2-Q4, 2013) 
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The median figure for lending per adult across postcode sectors was £602. At the 10th 
percentile, per head lending figures were £416 (close to two thirds of the median); and at the 
90th percentile per head the lending figure was £774. 
The individual postcode sectors with the largest and smallest per head values are 
provided in Table 2.  
Table 2 Largest and lowest per adult head loan borrowing figures by Postcode Sector 
Postcode Sector Postcode Area  
(within which Postcode Sector sits) 
Lending per head adult population (£) 
G2 1 Glasgow 13,405 
EC1A 4 East Central London 8,937 
G72 6 Glasgow 2,182 
PE7 0 Peterborough 2,009 
LS17 0 Leeds 1,846 
NE13 9 Newcastle upon Tyne 1,805 
MK42 6 Milton Keynes 1,749 
PR7 7 Preston 1,725 
SA7 0 Swansea 1,719 
EC1V 2 East Central London 1,666 
S3 7 Sheffield 84 
LS6 1 Leeds 84 
DD1 5 Dundee 84 
LS2 9 Leeds 81 
WV1 1 Wolverhampton 74 
BS1 1 Bristol 72 
L3 5 Liverpool 66 
S1 4 Sheffield 64 
DD1 1 Dundee 56 
L7 7 Liverpool 33 
*Lending per adult, average of three Quarters of data (Q2-Q4, 2013) 
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At the very top of the range are two observations which seem implausibly large. Lending per 
head was £13,405 in postcode sector G2 1 and £8,937 in postcode sector EC1A 4vi. Both of 
these postcode sectors refer to financial localities of city centres which have very small 
population sizes (Glasgow and London). It may be that in these two observations loan data are 
recorded to some addresses other than home addresses (for example, work addresses). At the 
other end of the scale, the rate of lending per head was less than £100 in postcode sectors 
across a range of areas. Whether at the top or the bottom of the range there is no strongly 
evident geographical pattern although, for example, both lending level extremes can be seen 
to exist within different postcodes of the same city. 
Figure 1 illustrates patterns of personal lending for Great Britain by mapping the distribution 
of lending per head of population by postcode sector for the published bank personal lending 
data, overlain by Local Authority area. Data exists for all Local Authorities but it is striking 
that whilst substantial spatial variation is evident, it is again difficult to discern any area-based 
patterns in lending. There is, for example, no evidence of a ‘North-South divide’ nor 
particular regional bias nor barely even of urban spatial structure. On average, there are lower 
levels of personal lending in parts of rural Great Britain, although rural postcode sectors tend 
to cover larger areas making their patterns more visible than urban areas on this map. A more 
accurate map of levels of local lending would be possible if the data at least provided the 
number of loans per postcode sector as well as total value but, currently, per capita is the 
closest approximation to possible demand that can be made given the data released. 
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Figure 1: Average Bank Personal Lending per Head of Adult Population by Local 
Authority (GB) 
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If we move to the level of individual Local Authorities, patterns for different wards may start 
to be delineated, but only through local knowledge of the socio-economic characteristics of 
the area (see Brown, 2014). Figure 2, for example, takes the case of Newcastle and 
Gateshead.  
Figure 2: Average Bank Personal Lending per Head of Adult Population for Newcastle 
and Gateshead (GB) 
 
In this example: 
- The area with no lending data (green) is Newcastle city centre; 
- The adjacent areas with low lending values spread along the River Tyne are where 
deprivation levels tend to be high; 
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- Higher values characterise most of the outlying suburbs; and, 
- The highest (deep-red) area covers a new-build area of higher prestige housing. 
In the past, work on the geographies of finance – of redlining, exclusion, 
abandonment and the flight to quality – have identified the association of discriminatory and 
exclusionary lending practices with a variety of socio-economic variables and, especially, 
indicators of deprivation. Here, the postcode sector lending patterns could be overlain with a 
ward-based mapping of deprivation (i.e. formal knowledge of socio-economic area 
characteristics and, for example, using the (English) Index of Multiple Deprivation or Rae’s 
(2014) use of the 2011 National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification). If, however, as in 
past analyses, a relationship were to be found between lower lending patterns and particular 
socio-economic variables the limitations of the postcode sector data mean that using this data 
alone would still not allow us to infer if, say, lower lending was due to lower demand, lending 
practices by financial institutions or possibly the use of other finance providers by residents. 
In fact, as will be taken up later in the paper, more recent evidence of new consumer lending, 
especially by a raft of new subprime lenders, suggests greater complexity than just inclusion 
or exclusion in the relationship between lending patterns and socio-economic variables. For 
example, poorer households may be deliberately drawn in to ‘predatory’ lending whilst, 
potentially, wealthier households have no need to borrow. But the same issue remains for 
analysis and interpretation – the dataset provision of only one indicator of total lending for a 
postcode sector severely restricts insight into local lending markets and lending behaviour. 
 
A comparison of personal lending data with area-based deprivation Census data 
 
Further use of Census 2011 data does make it possible to undertake some basic preliminary 
comparisons of the bank personal lending data with area level characteristics of populations in 
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different postcode sectors. What follows, however, is necessarily descriptive. The analysis 
does not test for causality or any processes which underlie the patterns observed because there 
is no data about who applies for loans, the loan acceptance rate, interest rates and how these 
differ by individual or area characteristics. Moreover, in the sets of measures presented, 
personal lending and Census variables are area-based and thus ‘average’ across households 
and individuals.  
Area-based Census analysis was undertaken for the postcode sectors that had full 
information (i.e. those with Census data and bank lending data at each of the three quarters 
released). This left 8,864 postcode sectors, with a further two postcode sectors being omitted 
which were obvious outliers (G2 1 and EC1A 4, see Table 2 above). The Census variables 
presented describe dimensions of different characteristics of postcode sectors. These variables 
are:  
- Proportion of households with one of more deprived characteristicsvii; 
- Proportion of households which are owner-occupied; 
- Unemployment rate (among the population aged 16-74); 
- Proportion of the population who are non-UK born; and, 
- Proportion of the population categorised as ethnic minority. 
Table 3 provides simple bivariate correlations between the variables listed and a postcode 
sector’s personal lending per adult head of populationviii. 
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Table 3 Bivariate correlation of personal lending and Postcode Sector characteristics 
(Spearman’s rho) 
 Lending per adult 
Proportion of population non UK Born        -0.2119*** 
Proportion of population ethnic minority -0.1105*** 
Unemployment rate -0.0706*** 
Proportion of households deprived on at least one measure                      -0.1555*** 
Proportion of households owner-occupied 0.2437*** 
 Number of observations: 8,862; *** Significant at 0.001 
In all cases these individual relationships are relatively weak, although all are statistically 
significant and move in the direction that might be expected. The strongest single relationship 
with personal lending is that of owner occupation rate.  
Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of one of these relationships – lending and 
deprivation.  
Figure 3 Bank personal lending per head by deprived household for Postcode Sectors 
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In general, the data suggest that average levels of personal lending tend to decline as 
an area’s deprivation level increases (although the decline appears to begin only after a certain 
point). The association between deprivation and lending levels at the postcode sector level is, 
however, relatively weak. This weakness may in part reflect the nature of the deprivation 
measure used which does not capture income directly, as well as the fact that a per head area 
based measure does not capture differences in proportions of borrowers between areas. 
Alternatively, it could reflect patterns in the use of different types of finance by socio-
economic circumstance which are not captured by bank personal loans data. 
 
Beyond geographies of financial exclusion? 
Research into geographies of lending in most nations beyond the USA has been severely 
hampered by the lack of data on lending from financial institutionsix. For campaigners and 
policymakers the lack of transparency and data disclosure remains a major concern and, as 
such, the release of this new area-based lending data has been widely welcomed. So, how 
valuable is this data? And in what sense(s) does it ‘deliver’, for those interested in financial 
inclusion and exclusion?  
Empirically, this exploratory analysis of the new data can only be described as 
underwhelming; it reveals substantial spatial variation in lending across Great Britain, but 
little by way of discernible patterns of area-based personal lending.  Combining the data with 
area based socio-economic data from the 2011 Census suggests that average levels of personal 
lending tend to decline as an area’s deprivation level increases, but the association between 
deprivation and lending levels at the postcode sector level is relatively weak. One reading of 
these findings is, of course, to argue that there are no clear spatial patterns of financial 
exclusion in Britain. We could argue that the banking industry’s historic lack of transparency 
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is an irrelevance, with no detrimental effect on governments’ and advocacy groups’ attempts 
to geographically ‘target’ financial exclusion. This reading, however, would be premature on 
several grounds. First, and staying with the empirical parts of our argument, the scrutiny and 
initial analysis reveals basic technical shortcomings in the data that profoundly limit its 
usefulness in interrogating area-based lending patterns; it is difficult to use this data either to 
support or challenge any but the most cursory of suppositions about geographies of personal 
lending in Britain. It is also important to re-state that this data represents an estimated 60 per 
cent of all personal loans, but only 30 per cent of the total national unsecured credit market in 
Great Britain. Second, and beyond its evident empirical limitations, the release of this data is 
a timely and significant invitation to consider the analytical and political limitations of ‘open 
data’ and its role (or not) in addressing the relationship between finance and economic 
marginalisation. As Walks  (2013) has observed, much of the scholarly interest in the socio-
spatial implications of high levels of household debt emanates from experiences in the US and 
the UK. The US HMDA data has enabled sophisticated analysis of mortgage lending patterns 
that allow policy makers to identify where subprime mortgage lending becomes predatory in 
its targeting of racial and ethnic minorities (Wyly et al. 2006). Yet, for all its relative 
‘transparency’,  the US has also been at the forefront of innovations in housing policy, 
deregulation, securitisation and risk-hedging derivatives that have incentivised the expansion 
of household debt (Immergluck, 2009; Engel and McCoy, 2011). In both the US and the UK, 
government policies have worked to normalise indebtedness as middle and lower income 
households are incorporated into mortgage markets, pension plans and other mass marketed 
financial products (Martin 2002, Aitken 2007). With the steady erosion of the redistributive 
elements of social welfare policy in both countries, individuals have been encouraged to 
become ‘financially literate’, to reimagine themselves as self-interested, responsible investor 
subjects (Langley, 2006: 919) as they – and not the state – become responsible for their 
welfare (Finlayson, 2009; Watson, 2009). In these contexts,  ‘risk’ is being reconfigured from 
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something potentially damaging into an investment opportunity and ‘the motivating force to 
enter financial markets for protection against possible unemployment, poor health or 
retirement’ (van der Zwan 2014:112). So, the availability of ‘transparency’ and good quality 
area-based lending data in the US is laudable, but it does not, in and of itself, translate into 
policies designed to reduce socio-economic marginalisation and unevenness. 
Third, and more broadly, research on growing levels of household debt in the UK 
and North America challenges how we are to interpret patterns of lending and borrowing. In 
essence, research points to an increasingly variegated debt landscape (see Walks 2013, 2014) 
characterised by complex and differentiated forms of financial (dis)incorporation. For 
example, credit rationing by banks may have squeezed out lending to low income groups and 
those with no or damaged credit histories, yet such exclusion has, in turn, been linked with the  
capitalisation of these self-same groups by a new breed of subprime finance organisations 
(French, 2014), engaged in predatory ‘inclusion’.  Thus, for example, Kear (2013) has written 
about the creation of a new financial subject, ‘homo subprimicus’, identified and then targeted 
by the rise of fringe finance and testimony to a financial system expert at efficiently extracting 
value from these ‘newly included’. As such,  
‘It makes little sense to think of this new subprime subject as either excluded, 
included, or the bearer of [financial] rights. It populates a market built by new 
technologies and rationales that have made it possible to imagine and manage the 
poor in asset-like ways’ (Kear, 2013, p. 941, parentheses added) 
Whether labelled as ‘exploitative greenlining’ (Newman and Wyly, 2004), ‘exploitative 
inclusion’ (Sokol, 2013), ‘financial precarity’ (French, 2014), or ‘adverse incorporation’ 
(Aitken, 2015), this literature illustrates the complexity of ‘fringe finance going mainstream’ 
(Aitken, 2015). We have moved beyond the binary of inclusion and exclusion in 
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understanding how new financial infrastructures are constructing lending patterns, 
indebtedness and economic marginalisation. 
To map and understand such patterns, however, we need good quality personal 
lending data. To move beyond ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ and understand variegation, to ask 
if low levels of lending (and borrowing) in some areas suggest economic deprivation, or, 
conversely, are they markers of relative affluence, we need much more in-depth and 
disaggregated analyses of geographies of debt. Furthermore, given the expanding role of 
financial markets in everyday life in contexts like the UK, it is important that such analyses 
are able to explore how personal lending interacts with other economic and social axes of 
differentiation, most notably housing and labour markets and age, gender, race and ethnicity 
(see, for example, Walks 2013).  
Conclusions 
This paper has provided the first exploratory spatial analysis of the postcode sector personal 
lending data made available by the BBA in 2013. The paper has interrogated the parameters 
and robustness of the dataset and generated an overview of personal lending patterns across 
Great Britain. More broadly, the paper has used this analysis to revisit the analytical and 
political limitations of ‘open data’ disclosure and transparency in addressing the relationship 
between access to finance and economic marginalisation. What the analysis really shows, 
however, is that any analysis of area-based lending patterns using this new dataset is 
substantially constrained. First, and on a technical dimension, uncertainty on data content and 
levels of imprecision are introduced by the processes of data construction undertaken by the 
BBA and its participating members. Such uncertainty and imprecision could be easily dealt 
with by greater clarity around the filter rules used, and the process of data construction by 
members could be tightened and made transparent through explanatory notes and / or a 
technical report, including the application of quality assurance processes. Whilst it is early 
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days for the dataset, with a limited number of releases to date, the detail provided should 
allow the ability for analysts to confidently apply like-for-like comparisons of postcode data 
cells over time and space. Second, for geographers, the publication of the data at postcode 
sector level increases the technical requirements and costs of meaningful data analysis. The 
underlying data is based on postcodes and if made available at this level would have 
substantial scope for development in to other more useful and commonly used units of 
analysis (such as Lower-layer Super Output Areas/Scottish Data Zones), allowing subsequent 
data fusion with other major socio-economic datasets in the UK. In turn, this would enable the 
process of bringing together geographies of supply and of demand to greater understand 
financial access and the potential inequities of differential and / or exclusionary practices. 
Third, and relatedly, a substantial driving force of the need for data fusion is the very limited 
number of lending metrics and indicators that are released in the dataset – essentially, one 
indicator, total lending, for a postcode sector. Useful further (aggregated) metrics of the 
supply of lending which would allow more substantial analysis – beyond merely that of total 
lending – would include content such as: number of transactions, including number of 
declines; individual loan amount bands; costs of gaining lending; and characteristics of the 
borrower (for example, age, gender, ethnicity, income bracket). Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of data protection, there remains considerable scope to enhance understanding 
through a greater breadth of release of lending data that is collectedx.  
Heralded by the BBA and its membership as placing the UK financial sector at the 
forefront of international efforts in data disclosure and transparency, the voluntary release of 
the postcode lending data saw those calling for such data disclosure subsequently challenged 
to ‘show its value’. There is no doubt that provision of substantially greater amounts of 
comprehensive area-based lending data can provide a major opportunity to identify a further 
piece in the jigsaw puzzle of localised patterns of financial provision in Great Britain, as the 
basis for understanding uneven financial access, and potential policy responsesxi. In contrast, 
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the conclusion to be drawn here on the BBA postcode data release can only mirror that of Rae 
(2015) in his analysis of the sister database on mortgages: 
‘This initial data offering is both very welcome and highly useful, yet it remains 
some way short of meeting its transparency objectives. At present, the situation is 
more one of opaqueness than transparency. If the government wish to provide 
analysts, activists and communities with the tools to properly assess the fairness, 
equity and spatial justice of [mortgage] lending in Great Britain, they must go one 
step further’ (p.192). 
In the case of this paper, for the residential mortgage sector and mortgage lending read 
‘personal lending’. Or, in other words, the Parliamentary Commission’s challenge to the 
banking industry to undertake meaningful disclosure has not yet been met. 
Putting aside the technical deficiencies of the data, ultimately, this data release is 
voluntary, by a certain number of providers, and simply does not cover the full personal 
lending market. A variety of (especially new) lenders are undertaking relevant annual data 
collection and reporting exercises, but do not do so in a manner that seeks to support area-
based lending disclosure (Henry et al., 2014). To gain a comprehensive coverage of lending 
activity in any geographically defined area, further voluntary agreements or regulatory 
compulsion is required such that all finance providers release dataxii. Moreover, individuals 
also sit in households, which may in turn be part of other lending markets – mortgage, credit 
card, etc. – and it is only through knowledge of such intersections and interactions that the 
true extent of household lending (and area-based debtscapes, Walks, 2013; 2014) can be truly 
discerned. New forms of financial precarity and debt-related vulnerability are being outlined 
and which are creating further challenges to policy responses to financialisation which, 
arguably, move well beyond that of ‘inclusion’.  
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Yet the point remains clear. Data disclosure, and the transparency it affords, remains 
central to understanding the distributional implications of finance’s penetration of the ‘nooks 
and crannies of social life’ (Lee et al., 2009: 728), the various spatial and social relationships 
produced by the expanding use of credit in modern society, and its effects on citizens and 
their subjectivities, institutional behaviours, community political action and policy (Walks, 
2013). Given the analysis here, and in the absence of legislation to mandate a satisfactory 
regime of data disclosure across the financial services, the question remains how further 
advances in transparency are possible or likely despite the increasingly urgent need to 
understand and respond to the distributional and differential implications of lending and debt 
across the UK.  
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i Rae (2014, 2015) has analysed the mortgage lending data released under this initiative. 
ii Analysis run on Q4 2013 personal lending dataset. 
iii It would be helpful to be able to also calculate a measure based on a ratio to local income, however both 
the underlying local income data and the quality of match between postcode sectors and the Middle Layer 
Super Output Area geography at which income data is released in the UK would introduce a considerable 
degree of uncertainty into such estimates.   
iv Defined as the total population aged 18 or over. 
v The Office for National Statistics via NOMIS has published estimates of population and many other 
Census variables at the Postcode Sector level. These Postcode Sector estimates are best-fitted to Postcode 
Sector boundaries from Output Areas. For details on this best-fitting see 
https://geoportal.statistics.gov.uk/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7BA7562082-
D57B-4ACE-BB37-D14036AAF813%7D. For Scotland data were downloaded separately from 
http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/census-results. Where Postcode Sectors are split, in cases where they 
cross council boundaries, the Postcode Sector parts have been combined to give a whole Postcode Sector 
estimate (see http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files2/geography/2011-census/2011-census-geography-
background-info.pdf).  
vi The total value of loans at these two Postcode Sectors is, however, well below the average. 
vii The Census deprivation variable was first released to accompany the 2011 Census. The four dimensions 
of household deprivation it measures are:  ‘Employment - any member of a household not a full-time 
student is either unemployed or long-term sick; Education  - no person in the household has at least level 
2 education, and no person aged 16-18 is a full-time student; Health and disability - any person in the 
household has general health ‘bad or very bad’ or has a long term health problem; and, Housing - 
Household's accommodation is ether overcrowded, with an occupancy rating -1 or less, or is in a shared 
dwelling, or has no central heating’. See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-
tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-286348 Table QS119EW. 
viii The measure used is Spearman’s Rank to allow for relationships to be non-linear. For simplicity we 
only present the coefficients for the relationship with bank lending; of course many of the variables are 
correlated with each other, in some cases very strongly (for example, unemployment and deprivation). 
ix See in France, for example, http://www.lelabo-ess.org/IMG/pdf/Propositiondeloi_mars2013.pdf.  
x See Henry et al. (2014) for a full checklist of recommended developments to the BBA Postcode Lending 
Data. 
xi See Open Data Institute (2013) for an example of how data made available by new digital platform 
based peer-to-peer lenders makes possible mapping and visualisation of geographical lending patterns in 
almost real-time. 
xii Indeed, in 2015, the national and very high profile Financial Inclusion Commission Report (2015) 
included as one of its recommendations that ‘Government to lead a collective effort with retail banks and 
others to promote wider data disclosure…’. 
